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JEANNE DORAN et aI., Appellants, V. CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[So F. No. 19191.

In Bank.

Apr. 28, 1955.]

JULES BESSETTE, Appellant, V. CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-Inherent Improbability of Testimony.-In actions for injuries sustained by
pedestrians when struck by trolley bus near center of street,
where plaintiffs testified that, after stepping from curb into
street, they observed bus had stopped at corner of intersection
about 120 feet away, and that they then walked straight across
street, did not stop at any time in making such crossing, and
saw approaching bus when they were at center of street, any
testimony of plaintiffs that bus was still at corner and was just
starting to move at time they crossed center of street is inherently improbable since it cannot be reconciled with happening of accident, and such evidence cannot be deemed substantial.
(S] Negligence-Last Olear Ohance-Elements of Doctrine.-Last
olear chance doctrine presupposes that plaintiff has been negligent, and as result thereof, is in position of danger from which
he cannot escape by exercise of ordinary care, and this includes
Dot only where it is physically impossible for him to escape.
hut also in cases where he is totally unaware of his danger
and for that reason unable to escape, that defendant has
knowledge that plaintiff is in such situation, and knows, or in
exercise of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff canDot escape; and that defendant has last clear chance to avoid
accident by exercising ordinary care and fails to do so, and
plaintiff is injured as result of such failure.
(Sa,3b] Id.-Last Olear Ohance-Elements of Doctrine.-If any
one of elements of last clear chance doctrine is absent, doctrine
does not apply and ease is governed by ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negligence.

[2] Doctrine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 1041; 171
A.L.R. 1365. See also Oal.Jur., Negligence, § SO; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 215.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Street Railways, § 127(2); [2, 3]
Negligence, §4S; [4,16] Street Railways, §102(8); [5,17] Negligence, § 48(2); [6] Negligence, § 148; [7, 12-14] Negligence,
§ 48(1) i [8] Negligence, § 217; [9] Negligence, § 156; [10] Negliaenee, 148(4); [11,15] Negligence, § 49.
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[4] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-Evidenee-Last
Olear Ohanee.-In actions for injuries sustained by pedestrians
when struck by trolley bus while crossing street, plaintiffs
were not "totally unaware" of their danger, as contentplated
by last clear chance doctrine, where they knew of presence
of bus as they started to cross strcet and also knew that it was
moving toward them when they again looked to right while
nearing center of relatively narrow street, and, with this
knowledge, proceeded to step directly into path of oncoming
bus.
[6] Negligence-Last Clear Chance-Plaintiff's Position of Peril.Total unawareness of danger, as contemplated by last clear
chance doctrine, does not exist where injured party is fully
aware of approach of oncoming vehicle up to instant before
collision and then shifts his attention to look in some other
direction while proceeding directly into its path.
[6a,6b] Id.-Evidence-Last Clear Ohance.-Last clear chance
doctrine, which relieves injured party of results of his own
contributory negligence and permits him to recover despite
such negligence, is applicable only in exceptional case in which
there is substantial evidence to support favorable finding on
each of several required elements of such doctrine.
[?] Id.-Last Clear Ohance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-"Continuing
negligence" of injured party does not deprive him of benefit
of last clear chance doctrine if all required elements for application of doctrine are present, since SUt>D "continuing negligence" ordinarily exists in all last clear p·ld.IlCe cases.
[8] Id.-Instructions-Last Olear Ohance.-Whether there is any
substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which could
justify application of last clear chance doctrine in given ease,
is question of law, and in absence of such evidence it is error
for trial court to instruct jury concerning such doctrine.
[9] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Last Olear Ohance.'-:"'If there
is substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which would
justify application of last clear chance doctrine, whether defendant should be held to have had last clear chance to avoid
accident is question of fact to be determined by jury under
appropriate circumstances.
[10] Id.-Last Olear Ohanea-Defendant's Knowledge of Plaintiff's
Inability to Save Himself.-Underlying basis for application
of last clear chance doctrine is that defendant was afforded a
last and a clear chance to avoid accident after defendant had
discovered that plaintiff was in helpless condition; it is based
on humanitarian concept that fault of injured party should
not relieve erring defendant of his liability after actually discovering that it is too late for injured party to avail himself
of any similar chance.
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[11] Id. - Last Olear Oha.nce - Ooncurrent or Contempora.neous
Negligence.-Last clear chance doctrine excludes from its application any case in which plaintiff's state of helplessness,
resulting from his own negligence, is created so nearly simultaneously with happening of accident that neither party may
be fairly said thereafter to have last clear chance to avoid accident.
[12] Id.-Last Clear Chance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-Doctrine of
plaintiff's continuing negligence has no application unless
negligence is proximate cause of injury.
[1S] Id.-Last Olear Chance-Negligence of Plaintiff.-If all elements of doctrine of last clear chance are present and plaintiff's negligence becomes remote in causation, then doctrine
applies; but if any of elements of doctrine are absent, plaintiff's negligence being continuous and contributory with that of
defendant bars recovery.
[14] Id. - Last Clear Chance - Negligence of Plaintiff.-Main
factor which may make plaintiff's negligence a remote rather
than proximate cause of accident, as contemplated by last
clear chance doctrine, is existence of some appreciable interval
after time that plaintiff has reached state of helplessness as
to enable defendant to gain actual knowledge of plaintiff's
state of helplessness and to have last clear chance to avoid
accident.
[16] Id. - Last Olear Chance - Concurrent or Contempora.neous
Negligence.-When plaintiff is actually aware of approach of
oncoming vehicle and when his negligent act, which removes
him from position of safety, occurs almost simultaneously
with happening of accident, there can be no such appreciable
interval thereafter as to enable defendant to gain knowledge
of plaintiff's helplessness and to have last clear chance to
avoid accident; in such case plaintiff's· negligence is not
"remote in causation" but is, in eyes of law, proximate cause
of accident, and last clear chance doctrine has no application.
[16a,1Gb] Street Railways-Injuries From Operation-EvidenceLast Olear Chance.-In action for injuries sustained by pedestrians when struck by trolley bus while crossing street, plaintiffs were not in position of danger nor in state of helplessness,
within meaning of last clear chance doctrine, until they had
ftached point at which they could no longer escape by exercise
of ordinary care, and where their state of helplessness was
created only by their act of leaving their position of safety
near center of street and stepping directly into path of danger,
and they could not have taken more than two or three steps
after leaving place of safety before accident occurred, their
act of negligence in leaving such place of safety occurred
almost simultaneously with happening of accident, and de-
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fendants thereafter did not have last olear ohance to avoid
accident.
[17] Negligence-Last Clear OhanC&-PJ.a,intUf's Position of PerU.
-Term "place of safety" ordinarily includes position of plaintiff while he is merely approaching plaee of danger, and he
cannot invoke last olear chance doctrine so long as he is only
approaohing but is not actually in position of danger.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order granting
a new trial. Robert L. McWilliams, Judge, in S. F. No. 19190;
Melvyn I. Cronin, Judge, in S. F. No. 19191. Judgment and
order affirmed.
Actions for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrians
when struck by trolley bus while crossing street. Order
granting defendant a new trial in S. F. No. 19190, affirmed;
judgment for defendant in S. F. No. 19191, affirmed.
Fitz-Gerald Ames, Sr., and Harold A. Galloway for Appellants.

)

Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Jerome Cohen, Deputy
City Attorney, for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-This is a consolidated appeal by plaintiffs
in two personal injury actions which were separately tried but
which arose out of the same accident. It is submitted on two
separate settled statements, which are substantially the same
in their presentation of the evidence and are so treated by
counsel for plaintiffs in discussing the legal points in the joint
briefs presented on plaintiffs' behalf. Plaintiff Doran appeals
from an order granting a new trial after judgment in her
favor. Plaintiff Bessette appeals from a judgment in favor
of defendants.
In the Doran case the trial court instructed the jury on
the last clear chance doctrine, and then granted a new trial
solely on the ground that it had erred in giving that instruction. In the Bessette case the trial court refused to instruct
on that doctrine. Plaintiffs contend that the last clear chance
instruction was properly given in the Doran case, and that
therefore the order granting defendants' motion for a new
trial in that case should be reversed. They further contend
that the requested instruction on the last clear chance doctrine
should havp. been iiven in the Bessette case, and that there-
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fore the judgment in favor of defendants in that case should
be reversed. While defendants make no objection to the form
of plaintiffs' requested instructions, they maintain that the
evidence was insufficient to justify the giving of the last clear
chance instruction in either case, and that therefore the order
and jUdgment should be affirmed. The evidence was substantially the same in both cases but viewing that evidence in
the light most favorable to plaintiffs (Roda.baugh v. Tekus,
39 Ca1.2d 290, 291 [246 P.2d 663] ; Daniels v. Oity & Oounty
of Ban Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 617 [255 P.2d 785]), we
have nevertheless concluded that defendants' position must
be sustained.
On March 17, 1950, about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck
by defendants' electric overhead trolley bus as they were
crossing Union Street at a point approximately 120 feet
west of the intersection with Fillmore Street, in San Francisco. Plaintiff Jules Bessette, accompanied by plaintiff
Jeanne Doran, had parked his automobile on the south side
of Union Street, about 100 feet west of Fillmore. Union
Street is relatively narrow, being 44 feet 9 inches from curb
to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs on both
sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west on the
sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into Union
Street intending to cross the street to a theatre on the opposite (north) side. Defendants' trolley bus, traveling west
on Union Street, had crossed Fillmore and stopped in front
of a drugstore on the northwest corner of the intersection.
There were two sets of streetcar tracks on Union Street, and
the bus was stopped parallel to the curb with its right wheels
just to the right of the most northerly rail of the car tracks.
Plaintiffs testified that after they had stepped into Union
Street and were a few feet from the south curb, they stopped,
"looked around," observed the bus stopped to their right
at the comer but saw no moving traffic, and then proceeded
straight, not diagonally, across the street. When they reached
the center of the street and were between the two sets of
tracks, they looked again to the right and saw the bus moving
in their direction. When plaintiff Bessette saw the bus for
the second time, he I I could not tell if it moved any distance
from the point where h~ first saw it when it was stopped."
Plaintiff Doran testified: I I When I was in the middle of the
street, I don't know how far the bus was from me. I know
the bus was going in my direction. . . . I cannot tell you if
it had gone half wq. I don't know if it waa aa close .. 10
61 eM II
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feet to me when I saw it the second time. As I was crossing
the street, I know the bus was coming in my direction but
I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or would
continue to go along." Neither plaintiff looked again in the
direction of the bus, but they continued to walk into its
path. Their memory of events ends there.
The bus driver testified that he was traveling between 15
to 20 miles per hour when he first saw plaintiffs running
diagonally across the street. At that time they were 15 to
20 feet ahead of the bus, 3 feet to its left and in the center
of the street, looking straight ahead in the direction in which
they were going. The bus headlights were on low beam.
The street lights and the theatre marquee and sign lights
were burning. Looking ahead from his stopped position at
the corner in front of the drugstore, the bus driver could see
parked cars the full length of the block on both sides of the
street; and there was nothing in the street to obstruct his
view. After starting the bus, he traveled some two or three
coach lengths (a coach length is 35 feet) before he saw plaintiffs. He then immediately applied his brakes and swerved
to the left, but the right front half of the bus struck plaintiffs.
The bus traveled 4 to 6 feet between the point of impact and
the stop. Traveling at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour
when he first saw plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the
bus within 23 to 26 feet, including reaction time. He did not
sound his horn but used both hands to turn the steering wheel
in an effort to avoid striking plaintiffs. He could not state
why he did not see plaintiffs sooner in the street, except for
these prevailing circumstances: plaintiffs were wearing semidark clothing-plaintiff Doran in a dark brown coat, white
blouse and beige skirt, and plaintiff Bessette in a gray suit
and" sel't of brown" overcoat; the stores on both sides of the
street, excepting the corner drugstore and the theatre, both
on the north side, were dark; and the southerly part of Union
Street was a dark ba\:;kground at approximately the spot where
he first saw plaintiffs.
[1] It thus appears that the only real conflict in the evidence was on the question of whether plaintiffs walked straight,
or ran diagonally, across the street and into the path of the
bus. Aceepting plaintiffs' testimony, it will be assumed that
they walked straight across. But plaintiffs' own testimony
further showed that they did not stop at any time in making
such crossing, and that they saw the approaching bus when
they we;re at the center of the street. Their own e.xhibits
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(plaintiff Doran's Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 7 and plaintiff Bessette's Exhibit 1) left no doubt as to the place where the
accident occurred. The point of impact was shown to have
been at a point near the center of the street, and no further
north than the center of the westbound tracks, which was
approximately 6 feet from the center of the street. Hence
plaintiffs' own testimony affirmatively showed that there could
not possibly have been any appreciable interval between the
time that they left a place of safety and the time that the
accident occurred. In this situation it is understandable that
plaintiffs should have admitted that they did not know how
far the bus was from them when they were at the center of
the street or how many steps they took after passing the
center of the street; and in the light of these admissions and
the abovementioned admitted facts, any testimony of plaintiffs
to the effect that the bus was still at the corner (about 120
feet away) and was just starting to move at the time that
plaintiffs crossed the center of the street is inherently improbable as it cannot be reconciled with the happening of the
accident. Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be
substantial evidence on that subject.
[2] Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chanee
applies in a particular case depends wholly upon the existence
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to bring it into play.
The doctrine presupposes: " (1) That plaintiff has been
negligent and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger
from which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care;
and this includes not only where it is physically impossible
for him to escape, but also in cases where he is totally unaware
of his danger and for that reason unable to escape; (2) that
defendant has knowledge' that the plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and
(3) has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of such faHUl'e." (Danie'ts v. Oity &- Oounty of
Ban Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 619,) [3a] If anyone
of these elements is absent, the doctrine does not apply and
the case is governcd by the ordinary rules of negligence and
contributory negligence. (Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696,
700 [218 P. 36].)
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here
because plaintiffs were aware of their dangerous position and
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could have saved themselves by the exercise of ordinary care.
Concededly, plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in crossing
the street in the middle of the block directly in the path of
the oncoming bus. They saw the bus shortly after leaving
the curb. They again looked to their right and saw the bus
approaching when they were in the center of the street, but
nevertheless they continued on their way without again
glancing in that direction. Defendants therefore maintain
that it cannot be said that plaintiffs, after seeing the approaching bus and then stepping into its path, were "totally unaware" of their dangerous position within the purview of
the last clear chance doctrine.
[4] In their effort to answer defendants' contention relating to the first required element, plaintiffs apparently
realize that they cannot claim that they were in a position
of danger from which it was "physically impossible" for
them to escape until after they had passed the center of the
street and had stepped directly into the path of the oncoming
bus. They therefore rely mainly upon their claim that they
were "totally unaware" of their danger. This latter claim
finds no support in the evidence. Plaintiffs concededly knew
of the presence of the bus as they started to cross the street,
and also knew that it was moving toward them when they
again looked to the right while near the center of the relatively narrow street. With this knowledge, they proceeded
to step directly into the path of the oncoming bus; and in
the light of this admitted knowledge, it cannot be said that
plaintiffs were "totally unaware" of their danger. [5] Total
unawareness of dang~r, as contemplated by the doctrine, does
not exist where the injured party is fully aware of the
approach of an oncoming vehicle up to the instant before
the collision and then shifts his attention to look in some
other direction while proceeding directly into its path.
Plair~tiffs have cited no case in which the last clear chance
doctrine has been held applicable to any comparable factual
situation. On the contrary, in a case which is closely parallel
on its facts, it was held that the doctrine was not applicable.
(Palmer v. Tschudy, s'upra, l!H Cal. 696.) There the plaintiff, a pedestrian, upon reaching the curb, glanced to her
right and saw defendant's automobile approaching at a
distance of approximately 200 feet. She started to cross the
street and when she had tal,en two or three steps from the
curb, she again glanccfl to her right and saw defendant's
automobile still approaching and, of course, nearer. Without

Ap~.

1955] DORAN V. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN li'RANCISCO

~

[44 C.2d 47'1: 283 P.2d 1]

)

again looking at the approaching automobile, she proceeded
to cross the street and was struck and injured. The trial
court there instructed on the last clear chance doctrine, and
the judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed because of
the error in giving such an instruction. This court recognized
that the last clear chance doctrine may be applied when the
injured party is totally unaware of the danger but held that
"plaintiff was aware of it from the beginning." (P. 701.)
Plaintiffs cite numerous cases where the last clear chance
doctrine has been held applicable but all are distinguishable
on their facts. Some of these cases involved situations where
there was evidence to show that the injured person was in
fact "totally unaware" of the danger. In Girdner v. Union
Oil 00., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 915], the trial court found
upon sufficient evidence that "up to the time of the collision,
he (plaintiff) did not see and was totally oblivious of the
approach of the truck, and the danger that confronted him."
(P. 200.) In Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., 216 Cal. 205 [13
P.2d 918], the evidence showed that the plaintiff "did not
see the approach of the automobile that struck him." (P. 206.)
And in the more recent decision of Peterson v. Burkhalter,
88 Ca1.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], there was evidence to show
that the injured boy did not see the defendant's oncoming
automobile. The boy in approaching the intersection on his
motor scoot.er and while 75 feet therefrom was "looking over
his right shoulder in the opposite direction," and as he
neared the intersection he "was still looking over his right
shoulder." (P. 109.) Other cases cited by plaintiffs involved
situations where there was evidence to show that the vehicle
in which the injured person was traveling was either stalled
or stopped practically directly in the path in which defendant
was traveling. (Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102 [237 P.2d
645]; Daniels v. Oity & Oounty of Ban Francisco, supra,
40 Ca1.2d 614; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Ca1.2d
630 [255 P.2d 795].) It thus appears that in each of the
cited cases there was evidence from which the trier of the
facts could find that plaintiff's negligence had placed him
in a position of danger from which he could not escape by
the exercise of ordinary care either (1) because it was
"physically impossible for him to escape" or (2) because
he was "totally unaware of his danger and for that reason
unable to escape." Under such circumstances, there was no
lack of evidence to support a finding of the presence of the
firit required element for the application of the last clear
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chance doctrine. Of course, in each of said cases, it was also
held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
that defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiff was in
such a situation, and that defendant thereafter had a "last
clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary
care" but failed to do so.
It would serve no useful purpose to review all of the authorities dealing with the applicability of the last clear chance
doctrine. Many of them have been reviewed in the recent
decisions of this court, and it has been recognized that some
cases have "presented close questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the application of the
doctrine." (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 297.)
It was further stated in the earlier case of Girdner v. Union
Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 202-203, that any "apparent
confusion which exists in some of the decisions upon the
subject arises in the application of the law to the facts, but
as to the rule itself there is little or no confusion."
A summary of the rules established by the recent cases may serve
to dispel any apparent confusion that may be said to exist
by reason of certain earlier decisions.
The ordinary case presenting the issues of negligence and
contributory negligence is governed by the traditional rules
which cover those issues, and which make contributory negligence a bar to recovery by the injured party. [6a.] The last
clear chance doctrine, which relieves an injured party of the
results of his own contributory negligence and permits him
to recover despite such negligence, is applicable only in the
exceptional case in which there is substantial evidence to
support a favorable finding on each of the several required
elements above enumerated. [3b] And as above indicated,
if anyone of these elements is absent, the doctrine does not
apply and the case is governed by the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negligen<>e. (Palmer v. Tschudy,
supra, 191 Cal. 696, 700; Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.
2d 290, 293; also Girdner v. Union Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal.
197, 202; Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, supra,
40 Ca1.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra,
40 Ca1.2d 630, 635.) [7] In this connection, it should be
emphasized that the "continuing negligence" of the injured
party does not deprive him of the benefit of the last clear
chance doctrine if all the required elements for the application
of that doctrine are present, for such "continuing negligence"
ordinarily exists in all last clear chance cases. (Girdner v.

Apr. 1955] DORAN

t1.

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

487

[44 C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1]

)

Union Oil 00., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 203; Oenter v. Yellow
Oab Co., supra, 216 Cal. 205, 207-208; Selinsky v. Olsen,
supra, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 104-105; Peterson v. Burkhalter, supra,
38 Ca1.2d 107, 111.)
[8] The question of whether there is any substantial
evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which could justify the
application of the last clear chance doctrine in a given case,
is a question of law; and in the absence of such evidence, it
is error for the trial court to instruct the jury concerning
that doctrine. (Wallis v. Southern Pac. 00., 184 Cal. 662,
672 [195 P. 408, 15 A.L.R. 117] ; Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra,
39 Ca1.2d 290, 297; Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry.,
54 Cal.App.2d 528, 543 [129 P.2d 503] ; Dalley v. Williams,
73 Cal.App.2d 427, 431-432 [166 P.2d 595].) [9] On the
other hand, if there is such substantial evidence, conflicting
or otherwise, the question of whether the defendant should
be held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident
is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under
appropriate instructions. (Girdner v. Union Oil 00., supra,
216 Cal. 197, 204; Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., supra, 216 Cal.
205, 208; Selinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 106; Peterson v. Burkhalter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, 113; Daniels v. Oity
&- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614, 619, 622623; Sills v. Los Angeles T1'ansit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d
630, 635-636, 638,)
While the determination of the question of law abovementioned is not free from difficulty in certain borderline
cases, the cited authorities show that the courts have not
hesitated to hold that the doctrine could be applied whenever
it may be fairly said that there is substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, upon which to base a finding of the
presence of each of the required elements. [6b] These authorities recognize, however, that it is only the exceptional
case to which the doctrine may be applied, and that the mere
fact that there is ample evidence to show that a defendant
is negligent, without substantial evidence of the existence of
the other required elements, will not warrant the application
of the last clear chance doctrine. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus,
supra, 39 Ca1.2d 290, 293.)
[10] The underlying basis for the application of this
doctrine, which permits an injured person to recover despite
his continuing and contributory negligence, is that defendant
was afforded a last chance and a clear chance to avoid the
accident alter defendant had discovered that plaintitf was
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in a helpless situation. It is based upon the humanitarian
concept that the fault of the injured party should not relieve
the erring defendant of his liability if defendant is afforded
such last clear chance to avoid the accident after actually
discovering that it is too late for the injured party to avail
himself of any similar chance. [11] But the chance which
is afforded to defendant must be something more than a bare
possible chance. It must be not only a last chance but a clear
chance, following actual knowledge of plaintiff's helplessness,
to a void the accident by the exercise of ordinary care; and,
by its very terms, the doctrine excludes from its application
any case in which plaintiff's state of helplessness, resulting
from his own negligence, is created so nearly simultaneously
with the happening of the accident that neither party may
be fairly said to have thereafter a last clear chance to avoid
the accident. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290,
294-296; Poncino v. Reid-Murdock &- 00., 136 Cal.App. 223,
229-232 [28 P.2d 932] ; Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532, 542.)
In applying the foregoing principles, it is helpful to bear
in mind the decisions which rationalize the last clear chance
doctrine in terms of proximate cause. (Girdner v. Union Oil
Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 204; Center v. Yellow Cab Co.,
supra, 216 Cal. 205, 207-208; Sparks v. Redinger, ante,
p. 121 [279 P.2d 971].) [12] As was said in the Center
case at pages 207-208: "'£he doctrine of (plaintiff's) continuing negligence has no application unless the negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury. [13] If all the elements of

the doctrine of the last clear chance are present and plaintiff"
negligence becomes remote in causation, then the doctrine
applies. If, on the other hand, any of the elements of the
doctrine are lacking, courts have declared, and rightfully so,
that plaintiff's negligence being continuous and contributory
with that of defendant bars a recovery." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the doctrine may be applied only if it may fairly
be said that plaintiff's negligence was "remote in causation. " [14] What then is the main factor which may make
plaintiff's negligence, in the eyes of the law, a remote cause
rather than a proximate cause of the accident 7 It is obviously
the existence of some such appreciable interval after the
time that plaintiff has reached a state of helplessness as to
enable defendant to gain actual knowledge of plaintiff's state
of helplessness, and to have a last clear chance to avoid the
accident. And as above indicated, such state of helplessness
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is reached only when plaintiff's negligence has placed him
"in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by
the exercise of ordinary care" either (1) because it is "physically impossible for him to escape" or (2) because he is
"totally unaware of his danger and for that reason unable
to escape." [15] Accordingly, when a plaintiff is actually
aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle and when
his negligent act, which removes him from a position of
safety and into a position of danger, occurs almost simultaneously with the happening of the accident, there can be
no such appreciable interval thereafter as to enable defendant
to gain knowledge of plaintiff's helplessness and to have a
last clear chance to avoid the accident. In such case, the
negligence of plaintiff cannot be deemed to be "remote in
causation."
On the contrary, such negligence is, in the
eyes of the law, a proximate cause of the accident, and the
last clear chance doctrine has no application.
In the light of the above discussion, it appears clear that
the cases involved on this appeal presented no substantial
evidence upon which to predicate the application of the last
clear chance doctrine. We have heretofore indicated that
there was no evidence to show that plaintiffs were totally
unaware of the danger, for they testified that they saw the
approaching bus twice after leaving the south curb-first
immediately after leaving the south curb and again when in
the center of the street. It is also clear that plaintiffs cannot
successfully claim that defendants had a last clear chance
to avoid the accident after plaintiffs had left their position
of safety near the center of the street and stepped into a
position of danger. [16a] Plaintiffs were not in a position
of danger nor in a state of helplessness, within the meaning
of the doctrine, until they had reached a point where they
could no longer escape by the exercise of ordinary care.
[17] As was said in Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73 Cal.App.
2d 427, at page 435, "the term 'place of safety' ordinarily
includes the position of the plaintiff while he is merely
approaching the place of danger, and so long as he is only
approaching but is not actually in a position of danger, the
plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine."
[16b] The distance from the center of the street to the
north curb was but 22 feet 4% inches. There were automobiles parked along the curb, thus leaving only the interven"ing space for the bus to operate along the northerly half
of the street, where the accident occurred at a point within
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a few feet from the center line of the street. Plaintiffs'
state of helplessness was created only by their act of leaving
their position of safety near the center of the street and
stepping directly into the path of danger. Under any view
of the evidence, plaintiffs could not have taken more than
two or three steps after leaving a place of safety and before
the accident happened. Therefore plaintiffs' act of negligence in leaving a place of safety and stepping directly into
the path of the oncoming bus necessarily occurred almost
simultaneously with the happening of the accident. Under
these circumstances, such negligence cannot be deemed "remote in causation," and it cannot be said that defendants
thereafter had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. We
therefore conclude that in each of these cases the trial court
correctly determined by the challenged ruling that as a matter
of law the record presented no substantial evi~ence to justify
the application of the last clear chance doctrine.
In Doran v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, S. F. 19190,
the order granting a new trial is affirmed. In Bessette v. Oity
&- Oounty of San F'rtmeisco, S. F. 19191, the judgment is
affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion for several reasons.
The first of these reasons is that the facts have not been fairly
stated. In determining the propriety of the order granting
a new trial and of the refusal to give a requested jury instruction in these cases, the evidence is to be viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Ca1.2d
290 [246 P.2d 663] ; Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, 40 Ca1.2d 614 [255 P.2d 785].) The appeal in these
cases is presented on settled statements of facts submitted
by plaintiffs with amendments proposed by defendants. The
excerpts from the settled statements, quoted in the majority
opinion, appear to be the excerpts least favorable to the
plaintiffs and most favorable to defendant. In some instances
the excerpts attributed to plaintiff Doran have been taken
from the statement submitted by plaintiff Bessette. They
do not appear in the settled statement of facts submitted by
plaintiff Doran.
TESTIMONY OF BESSETTE

From the testimony of plaintiff Bessette as it appears in
the settled stateme~t of facts, the majoriq opinioA quotes:
\
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When he " .•• saw the bus for the second time, he 'could
not tell if it moved any distance from the point where he
first saw it when it was stopped'" Read in the context of
the majority opinion, these words seem to imply that plaintiff
Bessette simply did not know where the bus was located
when he saw it the second time. That inference seems to
be the basis for the later statement of the majority that
plaintiffs were not totally unaware of the danger because
they knew that the bus was moving toward them when they
reached the center of the street. Read in the context in
which it was submitted to this court in the settled statements
of facts, this excerpt conveys a far different meaning. Compare the words quoted in the majority opinion with these
statements, which appear in the same settled statements of
facts as the testimony of plaintiff Bessette, which the majority
opinion apparently ignores:
"We walked about 6 or 7 feet into the street, going north,
and then stopped to look for traffic. We saw no moving
traffic in either direction, but saw the bus stopped at the
corner near the drugstore, with the back wheel of the bus
extending into the intersection. The visibility was good and
when I looked to my left (west) I was able to see beyond
Steiner Street, and was able to see the houses up there."
"We proceeded across the street and when I reached near
the center of the street I noticed that the bus was just beginning to move from the stopped position. It' don' , go hardly
at all, it just beginning to move.' (Sic) I continued right
across, going straight, not diagonally, and I don't remember
what happened after that."
"When I was in the middle of the street I looked to my
right to see the bus, what the bus was doing there at the
corner. As far as I could see, the bus was just beginning
to move."
"The last time I saw the bus it was northwest of Fillmore
near the front of the drugstore. When the bus was just
starting to move, it was right there in the same place that
I was looking the first time. I never saw the bus after that.
I know I was walking to the middle of street but after that
I don't know what happened to me. When I was at the
center of the street I didn't stop but continued to walk. I
know I was past the middle of the street when the accident
occurred but I don't know how far past."
"When he was looking at the bus again to see what the
bus was doing when he reached the center of the street and
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saw the bus just starting up, it seemed to him that he had
plenty of time to cross."
"Portions of the witness's testimony given in his deposition
were read into the record in which he said: 'I did not see
the bus just before it hit me.' He can't say how far he had
walked from his position in the center of the street up to
the time he was knocked out, because he doesn't really know."
"He did not recall hearing the sound of a horn, bell or
gong or any other sound coming from the bus at any time
prior to the accident."
"That he was wearing some sort of light colored overcoat
at the time of the accident. 'Yes, maybe it was a sort of
greenish-gray.' "
"When he first saw the bus, when it was stopped at the
corner, it was about 120 or 125 feet away from where he
stopped to look for traffic when he was standing about 6 or 7
feet out from the south curb."
"When he got to the middle of the street he looked to the
right and saw the bus again; he could not tell if it moved
any distance from the point where he first saw it when it
was stopped."
, 'When he looked at the bus a second time it was about
120 to 125 feet from him. From the time he left the sidewalk
until the time he got to the center of the street the bus hadn't
moved any distance at all, it was still in the same place,
right there at the corner."
"I knew the bus was moving in my direction but I did
not alter the speed of my walk because I had plenty of time,
the bus was so far I took my eyes off the bus and I never
looked at it again to see what was happening to it."
"When he passed the center of the street and saw the
bus start to move, he never looked in the direction from which
the bus was coming, and never looked at the bus again."
I believe it is quite clear that the brief excerpt of plaintiff
Bessette's testimony appearing in the majority opinion is not
a fair statement of the general tenor of his testimony.
Wrenched out of context, as it is in the majority opinion,
it is perhaps as favorable to defendant as any excerpt which
could have been found. It obviously does not represent a
view of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
The majority infers that plaintiff Bessette knew the bus
was coming toward him, did not know (nor apparently care)
how far away it was, and recklessly stepped into its path.
The evidence viewed as a whole indicates to the contrary,
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that plaintiff Bessette saw the bus still at the corner, 120
feet away, just beginning to move, and so continued to walk
across the street in the mistaken, but reasonable belief that
he had plenty of time.
TESTIMONY OF DORAN
From the testimony of plaintiff Doran, the majority opinion
quotes the following excerpts: "When I was in the middle
of the street, I don't know how far the bus was from me.
I know the bus was going in my direction. . .. I cannot tell
you if it had gone half way. I don't know if it was as close
as 10 feet to me when I saw it the second time. As I was
crossing the street, I know the bus was coming in my direction but I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or
would continue to go along."
Let us analyze this excerpt one sentence at a time, and
compare it with other excerpts from the same settled statements. The first sentence quoted by the majority opinion
is "When I was in the middle of the street, I don't know
how far the bus was from me." This sentence appeared
originally in the settled statement of facts submitted by
plaintiff Bessette. It did not appear in the settled statement
of facts submitted by plaintiff Doran. Compare the quoted
sentence with these statements, referring to the same subject matter, which the majority apparently ignores:
"When we reached the middle of the street between the
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw
the bus in about the same position, just beginning to move
in my direction."
"I saw the bus a second time when I was about the middle
of the street. The bus was in the same position mostly
and Mr. Bessette was on my right."
"Before we got to the middle of the street I was looking
and when I was in the middle of the street I was looking
again watching the bus." "The bus started to move when
I was about in the middle of the street. After I started
across the street when I saw the bus down at the corner
I next looked to see where the bus was when I was in the
middle. After that I didn't look any more."
The inference which the majority draws from the single
sentence quoted by it, is that plaintiff Doran did not know
how far away the bus was. The inference logically to be
drawn from the whole testimony is that plaintiff Doran did
know about how far away the bus was-she knew that it waa
Btill at the eonlel", about 120 feet awq.
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The second sentence of plaintiff Doran's testimony quoted
by the majority opinion is: "I know the bus was going in
my direction. . . . " This sentence also does not appear in
the settled statement of plaintiff Doran. Again, however,
the majority has ignored these references which seem pertinent:
"When we reached the middle of the street between the
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw
the bus in about the same position, just beginning to move
in my direction."
"When I looked the second time the bus was moving. I
can't tell you how close it was to me. I don't know if it
had left the position of the nearest corner."
The inference which the majority apparently draws from
the sentence which it quotes is that plaintiff Doran saw the
bus moving at full speed down the street toward her. The
evidence viewed as a whole will not support that inference.
A logical inference which may be drawn from the whole
testimony is that plaintiff Doran saw the bus still at the corner,
120 feet away, just beginning to move.
The third and fourth sentences in the quoted paragraph
of the majority opinion were "I cannot tell you if it had
gone half way. I don't know if it was as close as 10 feet
to me when I saw it the second time." Of the quoted paragraph, these are the first sentences which actually do appear
in the settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. But
compare them with these words, which also appear in plaintiff Doran's statement and which the majority ignored:
"When we reached the middle of the street between the
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (east) and saw
the bus in about the same position [about 120 feet away],
just beginning to move in my direction."
"The bus was in the same position mostly [about 120 feet
away] and Mr. Bessette was on my right."
"The bus started to move [from its position at the corner
about 120 feet away] when I was about in the middle· of
the street."
The majority picks out isolated sentences which imply that
plaintiff Doran did not know how far away the bus was i
but the majority ignores the many statements in the record
that indicate that plaintiff Doran did know that the bus
was about 120 feet away when she was at the middle of the
street.
The last senteAee in the quoted paraaraph ja "Ali 1 waa
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crossing the street, I know the bus was coming in my direction
but I don't know whether the bus was going to stop or would
continue to go along." Again, there is no such statement
in the settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. There
does not seem to be any direct reference in the statement
submitted by plaintiff Doran as to plaintiff Doran's knowledge
of "whether the bus was going to stop or would continue to
go along."
All of these purportedly representative excerpts of plaintiff
Doran's testimony were culled by the majority from the statement of facts submitted by plaintiff Bessette. I cannot understand how, if the majority opinion was guided by the controlling principle that the evidence is to be viewed in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, it could have ignored such
statements as I have quoted above. On the same page of
the Bessette statement that the majority quotes plaintiff
Doran as saying, "When I was in the middle of the street
I don't know how far away the bus was from me," appears
the statement "When I was in the middle of the street I
saw the bus just beginning to move." Can it possibly be
said that the majority views the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs' Can it be said that the facts have
been fairly stated' I think not.
The majority paints a word picture of plaintiff Doran
walking to the middle of the street, seeing a large bus bearing
down on her, apparently quite close, and blandly stepping
in front of it with no idea whether it would stop or not. This
picture is but a sadly distorted remnant of the original portrayal which appeared in the evidence. A clearer view shows
plaintiff Doran walking to the center of the street; seeing
the bus about 120 to 125 feet away, just beginning to move;
and continuing across the street with a feeling of apparent
safety; only to be struck down by the bus which rapidly
covered the intervening distance.
TESTIMONY OF THE

Bus DRIVER

The testimony of the bus driver is summarized in the
majority opinion somewhat accurately. Minor discrepancies
in the majority's summary include (1) " .•. he was traveling between 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw
plaintiffs..•. " The testimony was that he was traveling
20 miles per hour when he first saw them. (2) "Traveling
at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw
plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the bus within 23

496

)

DORAN

11.

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO [44 C.2d

to 26 feet, including reaction time."
The testimony was,
"Under the conditions present at that time and place, with
the bus travelling at 20 miles per hour, I could stop that
bus within 23 to 26 feet, including reaction time. JJ (3) The
bus driver did not, as the majority opinion intimates, specify
the colors of the clothing worn by plaintiffs.
I believe that a fair statement of the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs would have brought out, as the
settled statements of fact did, (1) that the bus driver from
his experience in driving along those streets, had found that
the dim lights sufficiently lighted up the road for the purpose
of operating the bus-that he could see whatever it was necessary to see in operating the bus. (2) That the bus headlights
lit up the whole street from curb to curb. (3) That before
starting up from the corner he could see right and left and
in front. (4) That all of the time, up to the time of impact,
he was looking strll,ight ahead. (5) That cars were outlined
quite clearly and he had no trouble in seeing them. (6) He
had a perfect field of vision (peripheral vision) and 20-20
VISIOn. These facts, coupled with the plaintiffs' testimony
that when they were in the middle of the street, the bus
was still at the corner, just starting to move, could quite
clearly lead to the inference that the bus driver saw the
plaintiffs when he was 120 feet away from them (Belinsky v.
Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 105 [237 P.2d 645]; Hoy v. 'l'ornich,
199 Cal. 545 [250 P. 565] ; Bailey v. W,,1son, 16 Cal.App.2d
645 [61 P.2d 68] ; Hellman v. Bradley, 13 Cal.App.2d 159
[56 P.2d 607]). If a jury should draw this inference, there
would be little trouble in holding that the last clear chance
doctrine is applicable. Clearly that inference could be drawn,
and would be upheld on any appeal, since there is evidentiary
support for it. A jury would not be bound by the direct
testimony of the defendant bus driver. Even less bound by
defendant's testimony are we, who are supposed to be viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.
The majority opinion states that the only real conflict in
the evidence was on the question of whether plaintiffs walked
straight, or ran diagonally, across the street. Having set
up this defenseless "straw man," the majority then strikes
it down by magnanimously accepting plaintiffs' testimony that
they walked straight across. In the entire majority opinion,
this is apparently the only point on which the evidence has
been viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, as required by law.
(Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra; Daniel$ v. Citll "" Count" of
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San Francisco, supra.) Having complied with the law on this
one minor point, the majority then apparently feels that it
is free to ignore the more significant items of evidence. The
majority opinion commences with the above mentioned correct
statement, then continues with a distortion of the facts by
which the majority seeks to prove that "there could not
possibly have been any appreciable interval between the time
that they [plaintiffs] left a place of safety and the time that
the accident occurred." From the conflicting evidence in
the record, the majority assumes that the accident occurred
about 6 feet from the center of the street. From this one,
isolated fact (which itself was contradicted by the direct
testimony of plaintiff Bessette, who testified that to the best
of his recollection he took six or seven steps after leaving
the center of the street before he was hit) the majority
attempts to prove a measure of time by use of a statement of
linear measurement. To prove that no appreciable time
passed while plaintiffs took the six or seven steps, it would
be necessary to know the rate of speed at which plaintiffs
were walking. The only direct evidence of the rate of speed
of plaintiffs' walk is the testimony that they were walking
at an ordinary walk, and that they didn't hurry, speed up
or slow down while crossing the street. The only facts from
which their rate of speed could be inferred are the facts that
plaintiff Bessette was 74 years old, and that there were streetcar tracks in the street. From these facts it could be inferred
that an ordinary walk for plaintiff Bessette might be slower
than an ordinary walk for a younger, more agile youth.
There is no evidence in the record as to the agility or gait
of the plaintiffs. Clearly, the majority was forced to make
assumptions wholly unwarranted by the record in order to
support the decision which it had dogmatically determined it
was going to reach.
Continuing with the same paragraph, the majority opinion
states: "In this situation it is understandable that plaintiffs
should have admitted that they did not know how far the
bus was from them when they were at the center of the street
or how many steps they took after passing the center of the
street; and in the light of these admissions and the abovementioned admitted facts, any testimony of plaintiffs to the
effect that the bus was still at the corner (about 120 feet
away) and was just starting to move at the time that plaintiffs crossed the center of the street is inherently improbable
as it cannot be reconciled with the happening of the accident.
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Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be substantial
evidence on that subject." This statement demonstrates the
absolute unfairness of the position taken by the majority
in order to prevail in this action. It cannot reconcile the
conclusion it wants to reach with the factual situation disclosed by plaintiffs' testimony, so it blandly says such testimony is "inherently improbable." In the light of the record
before us in this case such a holding is unworthy of a court
of justice.
To arrive at its predetermined conclusion the majority is
forced to ignore the repeated direct testimony of the plaintiffs
that the bus was still at the corner, 120 feet away, when they
were at the center of the street. The majority attempts to
justify its action by holding that the testimony of the plaintiffs is "inherently improbable." The only support for the
charge of inherent improbability is the assumed fact that the
accident occurred approximately 6 feet from the center of
the street. I submit that there is nothing inherently improbable in plaintiffs' testimony that the bus was still at the
corner, 120 feet away, when they were at the center of the
street. The evidence clearly indicates that the bus driver
started the bus by pressing the accelerator all the way to
the floor and that the bus reached the speed of 20 miles an
hour before hitting plaintiffs. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the bus driver took his foot off of the
accelerator until he was very close to plaintiffs. There is no
indication in the evidence of the maximum rate of acceleration
of the bus. Simple mathematical computation will show that
a bus traveling 20 miles per hour will cover the distance of
120 to 125 feet in less than five seconds. I submit that, even
allowing a reasonable time for acceleration, it would be quite
possible for the bus to cover the distance from the corner to
the point of impact in not more than six or seven seconds,
and that it would be equally possible for plaintiff Bessette,
a 74-year-old man, to take six or seven seconds to walk six
or seven steps across the streetcar tracks. How, may I ask,
can t.he majority find inherent improbability in such testimony 1 It can do so only by blindly and arbitrarily disregarding inferences and deductions to be drawn from the
evidence which has been accepted as reasonable and probable
by at least seven judges and 12 jurors who have passed on
the record in the Doran case.
The rule has long been settled in this state that contradictions in the testimony of a witness, even if the witness is the
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plaintiff, create nothing more than a conflict in the evidence
and an appellate court is required to treat such conflict the
same as if it existed between two or more witnesses. Conflicting testimony of a plaintiff constitutes nothing more than a
conflict in the evidence to be resolved by the trial court.
(Rice v. Oalifornia Lutheran Hospital, 27 Ca1.2d 296 f163
P.2d 860] ; O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Ca1.2d 145 [195 P.2d 10] ;
Bushey v. Union Oil 00., 13 Cal.App.2d 350 [56 P.2d 1272] ;
Von Hasseln v. Von Hasseln, 122 Cal.App.2d 7 [264 P.2d
205] .) Where the jury accepts plain tiff's testimony notwithstanding its contradictions, the appellate court must do so
unless it is so inherently improbable as to be no evidence.
(Miller v. Schimming, 129 Cal.App. 171 [18 P.2d 357].)
"Common experip.nce and observation teach us that strange
and astonishing things sometimes happen in the world of
physical phenomena, and accidents sometimes appear to happen in manner unaccountable. For these reasons an appellate
court must be careful not to give to dogmatic and undemonstrated conclusions respecting natural laws precedence over
the testimony of apparently credible witnesses; and the mere
fact that the admitted circumstances make the story of the
witnesses seem improbable will not justify a reversal by an
appellate tribunal upon the ground that the verdict is contrary
to the evidence. (Austin v. Newton, 46 Cal.App. 493. 498
[189 P. 471] ; see also Postier v. Landau, 121 Cal.App.2d 98
[262 P.2d 565] ; Murphy v. Ablow, 123 Cal.App.2d 853 [268
P.2d 80] ; Jones v. Re-Mine Oil 00., 47 Ca1.App.2d 832 [119
P.2d 219]; Bennett v. Chandler, 52 Ca1.App.2d 255 [126
P.2d 173]; Poe v. Lawrence, 60 Ca1.App.2d 125 [140 P.2d
136].)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated above, I do not believe that the facts are fairly
stated in the majority opinion. The summary of the facts
to which the majority opinion applies the law could conceivably be drawn from the submitted statements, but it is
emphatically not a view of the evidence most favorable to
plaintiffs. It is not even an impartial view of the evidence.
It is a view of the evidence most favorable to defendant.
Many different versions of the facts could be drawn from the
settled statements of facts submitted by the plaintiffs. I
propose that we adopt a version as favorable to the plaintiffs
as the evidence will reasonably allow.
On March 17, 1950, about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck
by defendant'8 electric overhead trolley bus as they were
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crossing Union Street at a point approximately 120 to 125
feet west of its intersection with Fillmore Street, in San
Francisco. Plaintiff Jules Bessette, accompanied by plaintiff
Jeanne Doran, had parked his automobile on the south side
of Union Street, about 110 to 120 feet west of Fillmore.
Union Street is relatively narrow, being 44 feet 9 inches
from curb to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs
on both sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west
on the sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into
Union Street intending to cross the street to a theater on
the opposite (north) side. They walked a few steps into
the street, stopped and looked both ways for traffic. They
saw no moving traffic in either direction, but on their right,
they saw defendant's trolley bus, stopped at the corner of
Union and Fillmore Streets, on the west side of Fillmore,
about 120 to 125 feet away from where they stood. The sun
had gone down and it was nighttime, but the visibility was
good, the street well lighted. They resumed walking straight
across the street. When they reached the middle of the street,
both plaintiffs again looked to the right (east) to see what
the bus was doing. It was still at or near the corner, about
120 feet away, but had just begun to move. Believing that
they had plenty of t:me to cross, they took their eyes off
the bus, looked straight ahead and continued straight across
the street. They did not stop at the center of the street,
but looked to the right while walking.
Meanwhile, the bus driver, who had 20-20 vision and perfect
peripheral vision, had started the bus by pushing the accel.
erator all the way to the floor. He was looking straight
ahead, in the direction of plaintiffs. There were no obstructions to his view. There was no glare from the inside lights
to interfere with his view. The bus headlights were on low
beam, but this was adequate to see all that was necessary to
be seen for operation of the bus. The lights lit up the whole
street from curb to curb. He drove straight ahead until ha
was within 15 or 20 feet of plaintiffs, at which time he pushed
on the brake pedal and turned the wheels to the left. The
right front side of the bus struck plaintiffs, and the bus
continued for about 8 feet after the impact before it came
to a stop. The point of impact was about six or seven steps
north of the center of the street, where plaintiffs last looked
to see the bus at the corner. The bus driver admits that he
did not sound his horn and that he did not apply his brakes
when he first saw the plaintiffs, but he claims that he did
JI.Ot see them lUltil he was 15 or 20 feet away from them.
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APPLICATION OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINB

With this statement of the facts in mind, let us proceed to
a discussion of the application of the last clear chance doctrine. The last clear chance doctrine is applicable in very
few cases. The case now before this court is one of thos(' few
cases. Whether or not the doctrine applies in a particular
case, as correctly pointed out by the majority, depends on
the existence or nonexistence of certain factual elements. The
majority opinion has adequately set out the nature of those
factual elements. What remains is to see whether or not
those elements are present in this case.
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here
because plaintiffs were aware of their dangerous position and
could have saved themselves by the exercise of ordinary care.
Plaintiffs may have been negligent in crossing the street in
the middle of the block when there were marked crosswalks
at the end of the block. But it does not follow that they
were aware of any danger from the bus. They saw it stopped
at the corner, walked to the middle of the narrow street,
looked again and saw it still a. the corner, just beginning to
move. They did not look at it again, believing they had
plenty of time to cross. They took six or seven more steps
and were hit. Awareness of the fact that a bus 120 feet away
is beginning to move does not constitute awareness of the
danger which actually was present. If it did, every pedestrian who crosses a city street would be in a constant state
of awareness of imminent peril, since there is usually some
traffic moving toward ~i1e when he crosses a street. The
evidence in this case, viewed reasonably, clearly shows that
plaintiffs were totally unaware of any danger.
The majority opinion erroneously assumes that plaintiffs
were "fully aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle
up to the instant before the collision. . . ." The majority
seems to believe that the plaintiffs were bent on suicide. It
intimates that the plaintiffs saw the bus right on top of
them and blithely ignored it as they stepped into its path.
No reasonable reading of the evidence could give that impression.
The case of Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696 [218 P. 36],
which the majority opinion describes as "closely parallel on
its facts, " has no application to this case, because it is clearly
distinguishable on its facts. I agree with the learned justices
of the District Court of Appeal, who stated in their decision
that the Palmer case was l!ot applicable to this case « Cal.
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App.) 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840). They said: I I Palmer v.
Tschudy [citation], is not applicable here for the reason,
first, that the facts are different. There the court held that
the plaintiff was aware of the danger from the approaching
automobile and by the exercise of ordinary care could have
avoided the accident, and hence the first element above mentioned required to apply the doctrine was not present. Secondly, the court there relied on the narrow interpretation of
the doctrine given in Young v. Southern Pac. 00. [citation],
to the effect that one is not in a position of danger until he
actually gets in the pathway of the oncoming vehicle. This
interpretation, like that given in Rodabaugh v. Tekus [citation], was held in Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco
[citation], not to apply where the driver is aware, as here,
of the fact that the other person is coming directly into his
path. " There is the additional factual distinction in the
Palmer case, that the plaintiff had audible warning of the
approach of the automobile, the driver of which twice sounded
his horn. No horn was sounded here.
Other cases which the majority opinion purportedly distinguishes (Girdner v. Union Oil 00., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d
915] ; Oenter v. Yellow Oab 00., 216 Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918];
Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977]) are
all applicable to the extent at least that they hold that one
who is totally unaware of the approaching danger may be
in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by the
exercise of ordinary care; that it need not be physically impossible for him to escape in order to qualify under this requirement.
It is interesting to note that the majority opinion in its
summary of the "facts" near the conclusion of the opinion,
states that plaintiffs were in a position of safety near the
center of the street, and not in a position of danger. I had
thought that this question was settled by the case of Daniels v.
Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 621,
where the same writer held that the plaintiff was in a position
of danger even though not directly in the path of the oncoming
bus, but only approaching its path. No reference to the
Daniels case was made in the majority discussion on this
point.
On the question of whether defendant had knowledge that
the plaintiffs were in a position of danger and knew or should
have known that plaintiffs could not escape, the evidence
clearly would support an inference that the bus driver saw
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plaintiffs when he was 120 to 125 feet away from them. The
bus driver himself states that he did not see them look in
his direction, that they just crossed in front of him.
In light of the preceding discussion, no comment should be
necessary as to the presence of the third factual element for
the application of the last clear chance doctrine. By any
reasonable view of the evidence, the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary
care, and he failed to exercise the same, thereby proximately
causing the plaintiffs' injuries.
THE

UNDERLYING ERROR IN THE MAJORITY OPINION

The astonishing thing about the majority opinion is that
even if one accepted as a starting point the erroneous and
slanted view which it takes of the facts, and even though in
most (but not all) particulars it correctly states the rules of
law, still it reaches a result contrary to established principles
of law and logic.
In reviewing the cases on the last clear chance doctrine,
the majority opinion states, "The question of whether there
is any substantial evidence, conflicting or otherwise, which
could justify the application of the last clear chance doctrine
in a given case, is a question of law; and in the absence of
such evidence, it is error for the trial court to instruct the
jury concerning that doctrine. [Citations.] On the other
hand. if there is such substantial evidence, conflicting or
otherwise, the question of whether the defendant should be
held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident is
a question of fact to be determjned by the jury under appropriate instructions. [Citations.] "
I know of only one test for determining whether or not
there is an issue of fact which should be submitted to a
jury for its determination, and that is the so-called "reasonable minds" test. I have never heard another test suggested
and I know of no other basis for determining this question.
In applying this test it would seem that when a trial court
has concluded that an issue of fact exists, and submits such
issue to a jury, and the jury, on proper instructions, determines that issue of fact, I can see no basis whatever in
reason or common sense for an appellate court to hold that no
issue of fact exists.
This court has in numerous cases stated without equivocation that" Even where the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might draw different conclusions upon the question
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of negligence, the question is one of fact for the jury."
(Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520];
Seller v. Market Street Ry. 00., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006];
Herbert v. Southern Pac. 00., 121 Cal. 227 l53 P. 651) ; Zibbell
v. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513]; see dissenting opinion, Gray v. Brinkerhoff. 41 Ca1.2d 180, 186,
192 [258 P.2d 834].} Can it possibly be said in the case
at bar that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions from the evidence contained in the record in this
case on the question as to whether or not the necessary
elements are present to give rise to the doctrine of last clear
chance Y The answer to this question is obvious. That reasonable minds have drawn different conclusions is demonstrated
by the record before us. The trial judge in the Doran case
gave a last clear chance instruction and the jury returned
a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The three members of the
District Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support a last clear chance instruction (Cal.
App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840, and three members of
this court have arrived at the same conclusion. In view
of this state of the record, it seems clear that the case is
decided in accordance with the view of the majority because
there are four members of this court who feel it should be
so decided, and it must necessarily follow that all cases of
this character will take the same course. The reasonable
minds test which has been followed by this court and all
other common law courts since time immemorial, is without
force or effect so long as four members of this court see fit
to arbitrarily conclude that the rule is not applicable to a
case involving a particular factual situation to which they
think the doctrine should not apply.
The majority opinion in this case is an outright usurpation
of the fact finding function of the trial court in at least two
particulars: (1) It is held that the elements necessary for
application of the last clear chance doctrine were not present
as a matter of law; (2) it is held as a matter of law that the
defendant did not have a last chance or a clear chance to
avoid the accident. The unsoundness of the majority opinion
on these two points is clearly shown by tracing the steps in
these cases. (The cases being joined in this appeal, and the
evidence being substantially the same in each, the Doran case
is outlined as the more graphic example.) (a) Evidence was
presented on each of the two points stated above. (b) The
trial judie, in the first instance, decided that theae werQ
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questions of fact, therefore gave them to the jury for determination. (c) The jury found certain facts to be true. (It
is not necessary to detail the findings-the logic is the same
in any case.) (d) The trial judge granted a new trial. (e)
The three able justices of the District Court of Appeal unanimously decided that reasonable minds could differ on the
evidence presented, therefore reversed the order granting a
new trial. (See Doran v. Oity &- Oounty of Ban Francisco
(Cal.App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840.) (f) On appeal
to this court, a majority of the court decides that reasonable
minds could not differ on the evidence presented, therefore
affirms the order granting a new trial. As I pointed out in
my concurring opinion in Daniels v. Oity &- Oounty of Ban
Francisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614, 628, by holding that reasonable minds could not differ, the majority of this court is
saying that the trial judge, the trial jury, the members of
the District Court of Appeal, and their dissenting brethren
on this court do not have reasonable minds. If the majority
opinion says any less than this, then the problem is one of
semantics. The law is clear; the logic is inescapable; the
only possible reconciliation of the majority opinion and
common sense must be found in divergence of opinion as to
the meaning of the words used. The meaning which I attach
to the words of the majority opinion shows to me that the
majority opinion is illogical.
This is not the first case of this sort to come before this
court. Nor is this the first time that the majority has followed this illogical course (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra,
39 Ca1.2d 290; Gore v. Market Street Ry. 00., 4 Ca1.2d 154
[48 P.2d 2] ; Young v. Southern Pac. 00., 182 Cal. 369 [190
P. 36]). Nor is this the first time that I have expressed my
views on this subject (see Belinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Ca1.2d
102; dissenting opinions, Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.
2d 290; Bparks v. Redinger, ante, pp. 121,126 [279 P.2d 971] ;
concurring opinion, Dam:els v. Oity &- Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 614; Recent Trends in Oourt Decisions
in Oalifornia, 5 Hast. L.J. 133). Unless we wish to repeal
the portions of the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of· California which guarantee
the right to trial by jury, the result of this case must not be
allowed to stand.
I would commend to the majority of this court a reading
of the history of the development of the jury system (e. g.,
James B. Thayer, Tha Jurll and ItB Development, 5 Harv.
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L.Rev. 249 (1892).) A cursory examination of that history
will show that from its first establishment as a part of our
system of law, the jury has had the function of determining
facts. From the twelfth century to date the controlling maxim
has been Had questionern facti n01l respondent judices, ad
questionem legis non respondent ,jurat ores. " This may be
loosely translated as "the judges do not answer questions
of fact, the jurors do not answer questions of law." The
trend of decisions in this court clearly shows that some of my
colleagues on this bench do not feel the weight of the
centuries of history which have produced this rule. Do they
seek a return to the feudal system or some other pre-twelfth
century form of judicial administration'
I would also recommend to the majority, a rereading and
a reconsideration of the analysis of this problem which was
made in my dissenting opinion in Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra,
39 Ca1.2d 290, 297, 303. The closing statement which I
made there perfectly fits the situation in this case. "I do
not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that the record
in this case presents a factual situation on which reasonable
minds cannot differ. What has happened thus far demonstrates beyond question that reasonable minds have arrived
at different conclusions on the record before us. Such being
the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is one of
fact and not of law, and hence should be determined by the
trier of fact-the jury in this case.
e, While the majority opinion in this case will create great
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other
decisions of this court and the District Court of Appeal which
I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reaching
concern is the problem that it is in direct violation of the
constitutional provision that 'the right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and remain inviolate'; (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation
is presented in a case in which litigants are entitled to a
jury trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case
from the jury and decides as a matter of law that there is
no h;sue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been
deprived of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been violated. Such is the situation in the case at bar. While this
result may seem to be unimportant in this case, it has an
insidious impact on our whole constitutional structure. If
judges who have taken a sol('mn oath to support the Constitution can ruthlessly disregard its provisions, as the ma-

and unalterably opposed to this trend in the decisions of
this court.
In these two cases, I would reverse the order and the judg.
ment respectively.
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, J.-We dissent.
In our opinion the evidence was sufficient to justify the
giving of instructions on the last clear chance doctrine.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 25,
1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor. J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

